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Economists￿knowledge of micro-level and aggregate investment is still far from being
conclusive. The only thing seemingly well-established is the empirical rejection of the
standard neoclassical investment model.1 The question of which of the assumptions
of the neoclassical model lead to its failure to what extent has yet to be answered.
Beginning with Fazzari et al. (1988), the empirical literature has emphasized the role of
￿nancial factors in company-level investment. More recently, attention has been drawn
to the role of non-convexities in investment technology.2
This paper empirically investigates the interaction of both of these deviations from
the neoclassical model. Our analysis follows the so-called "gap-approach", which is es-
sentially an error correction model for investment. This two-step approach ￿rst measures
the di⁄erence ("gap") between the actual stock of capital and the capital stock a com-
pany would like to hold if there were no adjustment costs. In the second step, investment
is regressed on this gap-measure. Especially in the context of ￿nancial frictions, this ap-
proach can generate new insights, since it sequentially estimates target capital levels
and adjustment dynamics. Therefore, it allows us to di⁄erentiate between short and
long run in￿ uences of ￿nancial variables. Additionally, the approach reveals whether
abundant ￿nancial resources alter investment-rates mainly by directly shifting average
investment-rates, or by changing the investment process in a more complex manner in
interaction with fundamental investment incentives.
Despite the advantages of the "gap model" it has to be applied with some care.
Cooper and Willis (2004) have recently shown that the model is somewhat sensitive
to deviations from its basic assumptions. Hence without pre-testing the underlying
assumption of the model, one may draw misleading conclusions from its estimation. The
present paper takes this issue into account. The core of Cooper and Willis￿argument
is that a measurement-error problem may result if productivity has below unit-root
serial correlation and is not directly observable. Therefore, we estimate productivity
by exploiting all available ￿rm-level data on employment, wages and sales, following the
method developed in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002) to minimize the measurement error
1See Caballero (2000).
2For evidence on non-convex adjustment costs, see Caballero et al. (1995), Doms and Dunne (1998),
Cooper et al. (1999), Caballero and Engel (1999), Goolsbee and Gross (1997), Abel and Eberly (2002),
or Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002).
The literature on ￿nancial frictions and their impact on investment has been surveyed by Hubbard
(1998). Mairesse et al. (1999) also give a broad overview. More recent contributions are e.g. Kaplan
and Zingales (1997), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), Guarglia (1999), Cummins et al. (1999), or
Erickson and Whited (2000).
1in the ￿rst place. Secondly, we show that both productivity and capital at the ￿rm level
exhibit a unit-root in our data, and are cointegrated, as one would expect from theory.3
Consequently, the cointegration error identi￿es the gap between the desired and the
actual stock of capital, so that Cooper and Willis￿criticism does not apply. Therefore,
irrespective of the actual form of adjustment costs, investment can be estimated using
the gap by a (non-linear) error correction model.4
For this error correction model of investment, it can be shown that under quadratic
adjustment costs and a unit-root in shocks to productivity the error correction should
be linear.5 If adjustment costs are non-convex instead, higher order terms of the coin-
tegration error become signi￿cant and the adjustment speed varies with the size of the
gap between desired and actual stock of capital.6 Empirically, not only the size of the
gap determines the adjustment speed: Whited (2004) shows for US data that ￿nancially
constrained ￿rms invest much less frequently than unconstrained ones. Theoretically,
the in￿ uence of ￿nance on adjustment speed has been studied by Holt (2003) and in a
companion paper to this one (Bayer, 2002). The latter paper also provides empirical
evidence from an UK database and both papers show the potential importance of the
interaction of a ￿nancial frictions and ￿xed adjustment costs. Therefore, we allow ￿nan-
cial frictions to a⁄ect both, the adjustment process (investment) and the desired stock
of capital. However, we only ￿nd a signi￿cant in￿ uence of ￿nance on the adjustment
process, so that ￿nance only plays a role in the short run.7
To be able to di⁄erentiate between long-run and short-run in￿ uences of ￿nance on
investment and capital, the analysis has to rely on a stock measure of liquidity rather
than on ￿ ow-measures. Blinder (1988) has pointed out that a stock measure is also
preferable on theoretical grounds. As this stock measure, ideally one would use the line
of credit for which we take the equity ratio as a proxy, whereby the equity ratio is the
3Our approach hence is similar to Caballero et al. (1995) but uses a di⁄erent measure for productivity
and hence for the desired stock of capital. Also, Caballero et al. estimate the cointegration relation using
OLS, while we employ a panel dynamic LS method.
4Non-linear error-correction models can be understood as a generalization of threshold-cointegration
models and linear error-correction models. Non-linear error-corection models have for example been
recently applied to the analysis of ￿nancial data (Breitung and Wul⁄, 2001).
5See Rotemberg (1987) for a formal proof.
6Under the assumption of non-stationary productivity the gap approach hence appears preferable
to a q-theoretic measures of investment incentives, since these measures are known to be problematic
whenever stock-markets are not (perfectly) e¢ cient (Cummins et al., 1999), whenever there are rents
not related to the stock of capital (Merz and Yashiv, 2002), or when adjustment cost are not convex
(Barnett and Sakellaris, 1999, p. 259).
7In the latest version of her paper, Whited (2004) reports a similar phenomenon for a simulated
model of investment under non-convex adjustment costs and costly external ￿nance.
Similarly, Guarglia (1999) ￿nds that liquidity proxies and ￿rm size is uncorrelated, wheras investment
and liquidity is.
2book value of equity over the book value of assets.
Like all measures of liquidity the equity ratio is partly endogenous and a result of
past productivity shocks. Therefore, its endogeneity must be taken into account for the
econometric analysis. In contrast to a ￿ ow measure, however, endogeneity will mostly
play a role for the long-run analysis, but not that much for the short-run. The equity-
ratio at the beginning of the investment period is pre-determined and should not strongly
correlate with innovations to investment. This allows us to concentrate on endogeneity
and (below unit-root) autoregressive behavior of equity for the long-run regression. We
￿nd an (insigni￿cant) negative correlation of the equity ratio and the capital level when
not controlling for endogeneity. Yet, when endogeneity is controlled for, the equity
ratio still does not signi￿cantly correlate with the level of capital a company employs.
Interestingly and maybe counterintuitively, however, the estimated long-run elasticity of
capital with respect to the equity ratio increases when controlling for endogeneity. In
the short-run investment regression, we control for endogeneity by exploiting just the
variation of the equity ratio relative to its ￿rm-speci￿c long-run mean. This especially
accounts for di⁄erent baseline-access to capital markets across ￿rms.
For investment, the following three results are found: First, the gap between desired
and actual capital can explain a relatively large part of the variation in investment.
Second, investment is a moderately convex function of the gap. Third, the ￿nancial
condition has a signi￿cant short-run impact on investment decisions and this impact
varies strongly with the size of the gap. A good ￿nancial status is complementary to a
large gap. Figuratively speaking, ￿nance is the grease in the investment process but not
the fuel. It eases adjustment to the target level of capital, but from the estimation of the
level equation we know it does not alter that target. Since ￿nance has no predictive power
for capital decisions in the long run, these results for investment cannot be attributed
to a lack of measuring capital productivity correctly. If ￿nance contained information
about future investment prospects that was not contained in the productivity measure,
this were re￿ ected in a signi￿cant correlation of ￿nance and the level of capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical
grounds for the empirical analysis. It ￿rst reviews the recent debate between Cooper and
Willis (2004) and Caballero and Engel (2004) on the gap approach and hence focuses
our attention on the most critical steps and parts of the analysis. Secondly, the section
sketches a possible extension of the gap approach to cover the in￿ uence of ￿nancial
frictions. Thirdly, section 2 also introduces the method used by the present paper
to measure productivity, and estimates the long-run optimal stock of capital and the
investment equation. Section 3 gives a brief description of the data that has been used.
3Section 4 presents the empirical results of both the regression for the optimal stock of
capital and the investment regression. Section 5 compares these results to those of a
companion paper for UK data (Bayer, 2002). Moreover possible extensions are discussed.
Finally section 6 concludes and a data appendix follows.
2 The gap approach to capital adjustment
2.1 The gap model and non-convex adjustment costs￿ summarizing a
current debate
Analyzing investment (and employment) data using the gap approach has been intro-
duced by Caballero and Engel (1993) and Caballero et al. (1995, 1997). All three papers
show that aggregate investment (employment) also depends signi￿cantly on the higher
order moments of the distribution of fundamental investment incentives. Although the
central focus of these papers is the aggregate consequences of non-convexities, their
estimation procedure may also be interpreted as a test for these non-convexities.8
This view has recently come under criticism by Cooper and Willis (2004), and since
the present paper also follows a gap approach a quick summary of the argument seems
appropriate before laying out our own analysis. Cooper and Willis acknowledge that un-
der the null hypothesis of non-convex adjustment costs the gap approach may be valid
if ￿rm productivity follows a random walk. However, they argue that the procedures
used to measure the gap will result in a severe measurement error under the alternative
hypothesis of convex adjustment costs and below unit-root serial correlation of produc-
tivity. This measurement error then causes the higher order moments of the micro-level
gap-distribution to become signi￿cant when regressing investment on the ￿rst three mo-
ments of this gap distribution. Yet, the higher order moments should not be signi￿cant
under the convex-cost alternative and Cooper and Willis ￿nd that higher-order moments
are not signi￿cant when the gap is measured correctly. Consequently, Caballero and En-
gel￿ s "test" based on the estimated parameters in the investment regression su⁄ers from
a lack of power.
In their reply to this criticism, Caballero and Engel (2004) provide two central argu-
ments why Cooper and Willis￿critique is somewhat misleading. Their ￿rst point is that
only when the serial correlation of productivity shocks is dropped to unrealistically low
levels, do the higher-order terms of the gap become signi￿cant regressors.9 Their second
8Caballero and Engle (2004, p. 5) emphasize the central point of their analysis being a macro-
data description conditional on the presumption that microeconomic behavior is driven by ￿xed costs.
However, interpreting their aproach as a testing procedure appears to be more fruitful.
9This can be seen for example by inspecting Table 4 and 5a in Cooper and Willis (2003a, pp. 32).
Cooper and Willis try two speci￿cations for the adjustment costs, the ￿rst speci￿cation generates a half-
4point is that the pure focus on statistical signi￿cance of the higher order moments is also
misleading. They argue that the increase in the R2-statistics when adding higher-order
moments and most importantly the di⁄erence in adjustment speeds between large-gap
and small-gap ￿rms can still be used to test for non-convexities since they are not a⁄ected
by Cooper and Willis￿measurement-error argument.
Hence in summary, one may take three central points from the debate: First, when
using the gap approach one should try carefully to minimize the potential sources of
measurement errors when deriving productivity. Second, it is essential to check for a
unit-root in productivity and capital and proceed with the gap approach only if there
is a unit-root. And third, one should especially focus on adjustment-speed di⁄erences
when interpreting the results of the investment equation using the gap.
2.2 A gap model with ￿nancial frictions
The gap model itself can be derived from the assumption of infrequent investment￿
e.g. the constant hazard model of Calvo (1983)￿ but also from quadratic adjustment
costs and smooth adjustment over time (Sargent, 1978 and Rotemberg, 1987). Formally,
the model may be described as follows. Let k￿ denote the log of the stock of capital
a company would hold if adjustment costs are set to zero for one period. In a world
without ￿nancial frictions k￿ would only depend on ￿rm productivity ￿: When ￿nancial
frictions distort ￿rm decisions, ￿nancial means or "liquidity" e also in￿ uences k￿:
This desired level of capital k￿ (e;￿) now is exactly the level of capital the ￿rm
adjusts too if the only costs of adjustment are ￿xed (see e.g. Caballero and Engel (1999)
and Bayer (2002) for a microfoundation without or with ￿nancial frictions respectively).
Thus upon investment, the gap is closed completely and the investment rate is simply
the di⁄erence x of the current stock of capital k and the desired stock of capital k￿ (in
logs), x := k￿￿k: Consequently, the expected investment rate is a compound of the gap
x; which is mandated investment, and the probability of investment ￿: This probability
can alternatively be interpreted as the adjustment speed in a convex adjustment cost
model with continuous adjustment, see e.g. Sargent (1978). If we allow ￿ to depend
life of the gap of one month, implying that at the end of the year the ￿rm basically holds all the capital
it would like to hold in the absence of adjustment costs. The second speci￿cation implies a half-life of
one year, which still is a relatively fast adjustment speed.
First, the number of false rejections of the convex-cost model substantially decreases when adjustment
costs increase and become more realistic. Second for the one-year half life model, out of 18 estimations
with an autocorrelation of productivity being larger than 0.9, the estimation procedure only ￿nds a
higher-order term being falsely signi￿cant at the 10% level four times, while we would expect to ￿nd
approximately two. Out of these four errors of ￿rst order, however, in three cases the sign of the
higher-order term is negative.
5on both liquidity e and the capital gap x; we obtain for the expected investment rate
it = kt ￿ kt￿1 :10
i(x;e) = ￿(x;e)x = ￿[x(e;￿);e]x(e;￿): (1)
Now, taking ￿rst derivatives decomposes the e⁄ect of liquidity e on investment into a
direct e⁄ect on the adjustment speed and an indirect e⁄ect via the optimal stock of


















































Both equations together show that the indirect e⁄ect in (2) is an e⁄ect that is equiv-
alent to a productivity change that alters the optimal capital level. Therefore, we can
alternatively term the indirect e⁄ect a level e⁄ect, whereas the direct e⁄ect is a result of



















Moreover, the latter equation shows that the level e⁄ect itself decomposes into a term
re￿ ecting the sensitivity of investment to changes in the gap
@i(x;e)
@x and the term @x
@e=@x
@￿
which can be interpreted as the marginal productivity of ￿nancial means (liquidity).
Equivalently, this term can be interpreted as the marginal reduction in the user-cost-of-
capital from a liquidity increase.11
The term @￿
@ex re￿ ects the direct impact we assumed liquidity to have on the adjust-
ment speed, but why should there be this direct in￿ uence? Empirically, Whited (2004)
provides some evidence that the ￿nancial status in￿ uences adjustment hazards.12 Theo-
10See Bayer (2002) for a detailed theoretical model that combines ￿xed adjustment costs and capital
market imperfections.
11If one would think of liquidity altering mainly managerial decisions but not truly the cost structure,
this term represents how liquidity changes the managerial discount rate.
12Whited (2004) analyzes the hazard rates for investment-spikes of ￿nancially constrained and uncon-
strained ￿rms using Compustat data. Even though she concentrates on the existence of non-convexities
and ￿nancial constraints rather than on the interaction of productivity and ￿nancial constraints, she
6retically, a related e⁄ect has been shown by Holt (2003) and in a companion paper of this
one (Bayer, 2002). That paper also assess this interaction empirically using a sample
of UK-￿rms drawn from the Cambridge-Database and a di⁄erent method in identifying
the marginal productivity of capital.
In principle, the basic idea behind the frequency e⁄ect is relatively straightforward
and may be illustrated in the following very stylized way: Suppose a ￿rm completely
leases its capital that does not depreciate. If liquidity now does not in￿ uence the user-cost
of capital, then the stock of capital the ￿rm adjusts to is only determined by productivity
and does not depend on liquidity. Hence, there is no level e⁄ect, but liquidity may still
in￿ uence the probability of adjustment: Suppose the ￿rm pays some ￿xed costs upon
investment, then a given amount of internal funds (liquidity) directly determines how
often the ￿rm can expect to adjust over a certain interval of time. For example, if
liquidity e does not grow and the expected ￿xed cost of adjustment is C, this ￿rm is
endowed with e=C adjustment options. Since each option is more valuable if the number
of options is small, a small number of options is equivalent to large adjustment costs.
Consequently, for a given gap x the ￿rm is more likely to adjust if liquidity is large, so
that this establishes a frequency e⁄ect of liquidity.
Although, a given pattern of frequency e⁄ect and level e⁄ect might be related to more
than one structural model of investment, this decomposition still carries information (as
Cooper and Willis (2003) show for the standard gap model for employment). Directly
related to the level-frequency decomposition, we can test two hypothesis about how
the availability of (accumulated) internal funds in￿ uences investment activity. The ￿rst
hypothesis re￿ ects the long run neutrality of ￿nance:
H0
0 : Internal funds have no e⁄ect on the optimal stock of capital a company holds.
This is equivalent to @x
@e = 0:
The second hypothesis accounts for the in￿ uence of equity on the investment process,
this is:
H1
0 : Investment reacts to changes in internal funds only because the optimal stock of








0 cannot be rejected, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds in the long run. More-
over, an empirical non-rejection of H0
0 also has an important econometric implication:
￿nds both evidence for increasing hazard-rates (and thus non-convexities) and a signi￿cant in￿ uence of
￿nancial constraints￿ which lower the hazard rates.
7the ￿nancial variable cannot contain information on long-run capital productivity that
is not included in the measure of productivity ^ ￿: If the ￿nancial variable e carries in-
formation on long-run capital productivity H0
0 will be rejected irrespective of ￿nancial
frictions being present or not. However, if H0
0 is not rejected ￿nance can still in￿ uence
the transition path of the stock of capital if there is a frequency e⁄ect of liquidity. In
this case hypothesis H1
0 will be rejected. Note that (only) if H0





2.3 The desired stock of capital
However, we can neither directly observe k￿ nor the productivity ￿ of capital. Typically,
as a proxy for the marginal productivity of capital or directly for fundamental investment
incentives Tobin￿ s q, the ratio of ￿rm-value over the replacement value of its assets has
been employed. Yet, there are two major drawbacks in using Tobin￿ s q, both related
to a measurement error. The ￿rst issue concerns stock market bubbles, which lead to
a measurement error with respect to the fundamental value of the ￿rm.13 The second
source of measurement error in Tobin￿ s q arises if there are more frictions than only the
adjustment costs of capital. Then ￿rm value includes all other rents the ￿rm can exploit,
but these rents might well be not related to the size of the stock of capital.14
Therefore, in this paper we directly derive the productivity of capital from sales,
employment and wage data instead and employ the ideas developed in Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2002) to measure capital productivity. As we can show that measured
in this way, both the productivity and capital are non stationary variables which are
cointegrated, there must exist a long run equilibrium relation between capital and pro-
ductivity. Therefore, there also exists an equilibrium level of capital k￿￿ (￿;e) for any
level of productivity (and liquidity). This equilibrium level of capital equals the average
stock of capital a company holds between two adjustments. If depreciation is constant
over time, the target level of capital k￿ and k￿￿ also equal each other up to a constant
that re￿ ects the expected depreciation between two adjustments.
The derivation of k￿ in Cooper and Haltiwanger￿ s (2002) framework starts from the
static optimization problem of a ￿rm that employs capital K and labor L (denoted in
straight levels not logs) and produces with a Cobb-Douglas production function. This
￿rm generates revenues Y according to
Y = ￿L￿K￿: (5)
13See for instance Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (1999) or Bond and Cummins (2000).
14See Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), Gomes (2001) or Merz and Yashiv (2002) for discussions of
this topic.
8For this revenue function, we assume that the ￿rm has market power or that production
is otherwise subject to decreasing returns of scale, so that ￿ + ￿ < 1:15 The variable
￿ represents total-factor productivity. If labor can be ￿ exibly adjusted, the optimal
employment decision is described by
wL = ￿Y (6)





















For given parameters ￿ and ￿, capital productivity ￿ can be calculated directly after one
has inferred ￿ from the production function, or indirectly from the production function
and optimal employment according to (6): Taking logs from (7); we obtain




Replacing Y according to (6) now yields the indirect measure of capital productivity,










Theoretically, the direct and the indirect productivity measure should be the same,
empirically they di⁄er somewhat.16 Hence, we take the average of both measures as the
15The assumption of decreasing returns to scale is well supported by the data, for every ￿rm in the
sample ￿ + ￿ < 1 holds.
Furthermore, note that although ￿rm indices like ￿i are suppressed for notational convenience in the
equations characterizing the empirical model and in its application the parameters ￿ and ￿ will be
￿rm-speci￿c.
16Reasons for the di⁄erence can be labour market imperfections or deviations from the assumption of
a Cobb Douglas production function.





The static optimal stock of capital k￿￿￿; which is the stock of capital the ￿rm would
hold in the absence of any adjustment costs and ￿nancial frictions, can be determined
by maximizing instantaneous pro￿ts, Y ￿uc￿K, which is earnings Y from (7) minus the
cost of capital for which uc denotes the user cost. From this optimization, we can infer
the (log) optimal static stock of capital, k￿￿￿; as
k￿￿￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ (￿ + ￿)
[￿1￿ ￿ lnuc]; ￿1 = 1: (12)
Since there are adjustment costs and capital market imperfections k￿￿ and k￿￿￿ may
di⁄er. This is re￿ ected by allowing the elasticity of capital to productivity to be di⁄erent
from
(1￿￿)
1￿(￿+￿); i.e. the coe¢ cient ￿1 of ￿ is di⁄erent from 1. Moreover, the ￿nancial
friction can be re￿ ected by assuming that the user cost uc depends on the aggregate
risk-free rate of return r, a constant parameter ￿ that re￿ ects ￿rm-speci￿c risk and
other ￿xed di⁄erences among ￿rms, and a term re￿ ecting the impact of liquidity on
capital cost, ￿2e. Putting these items together, we obtain
ln(uc) = r + ￿ + ￿2e and (13)
k￿￿ (e;￿) =
(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ (￿ + ￿)
[￿1￿ ￿ r + ￿ + ￿2e]: (14)
2.4 Empirical speci￿cation and econometric methodology
2.4.1 Measuring the desired stock of capital
This now gives four parameters to be estimated for each company: ￿;￿; and ￿1;2: The
most straightforward approach would be to estimate the parameters ￿;￿ directly from
the production function (again small letters denote logs)
yit = ￿ilit + ￿ikit + ln(￿it): (15)
17The average is very close to the common factor obtained by factor analysis. Moreover, the results
do not depend strongly on the use of either of the three alternative productivity measures.
Interestingly, using the direct productivity measure gives a slight increase in explanatory power for
the investment regression at the cost of slightly less sensible estimates for the capital stock analysis
compared to the indirect productivity estimate. The average of both estimates turns out to perform
close to both the direct measure in the investment regression and close to the indirect measure in the
levels regression.
10However, both the dynamic structure of the data and technological heterogeneity among
￿rms complicate the analysis. The expenditure shares for both labor and capital di⁄er
substantially between ￿rms (see ￿gure 1). Therefore, we must expect ￿i 6= ￿j; ￿i 6=
￿j in general and cannot estimate (15) by panel estimation techniques. Moreover, in
our sample y is non-stationary due to a unit-root in productivity, so that we cannot
estimate the production function in levels. However, even in ￿rst di⁄erences one needs
to account for endogeneity of capital and labor and has to use lagged ￿rst di⁄erences as
instruments. With only between 5 and 35 observations per ￿rm, this direct approach is
rendered infeasible. Therefore, ￿i and ￿i are estimated as average expenditure shares.18
Expenditures on labor are calculated as the product of the average wage per employee
of a speci￿c company times the number of employees. Expenditures on capital are
calculated as the average depreciation rate of a speci￿c company plus a 3% real interest
rate times the actual stock of capital.
Thereafter, ^ ￿ is calculated as the mean of the indirect and the direct capital-productivity
measure as described in section 2.3. Capital productivity ^ ￿ turns out to be I(1), just as
capital is I(1). Therefore we can estimate ￿1;2 from the cointegration relationship
kit = k￿￿
it + xit =
(1 ￿ ￿i)
1 ￿ (￿i + ￿i)
h
￿1^ ￿it ￿ rt + ￿i + ￿2eit
i
+ xit: (16)
The error term xit turns out to be stationary, so that there is a cointegration relation-
ship between productivity and capital; see table 2 in section 3 for unit-root tests. For
the estimation we use the Panel-Full-Modi￿ed-OLS (PFM-OLS) estimator of Phillips
and Moon (1999) and the Panel-Dynamic-OLS (PD-OLS) estimator of Kao and Chiang
(2000), which both are asymptotically equivalent. For rt and ￿i we control using ￿xed
time and individual speci￿c e⁄ects. The PFM / PD-OLS estimators unbiasedly estimate
the parameters of I(1) variables in a cointegration relation. They also yield unbiased
18To see that this is a feasinble approach, note that L ,Y and K are endogenous unit-root processes,
all driven in the long-run by ￿: Thus, (6) gives￿ loosely speaking￿ a cointegration relation. So that OLS




Yit if we can write the
estimation equation with a ￿ heteroscedastic￿error term
witLit = ￿Yit + Yitvit:
If the error were to come in multiplicatively, the geometric mean were appropriate. Note that using the
geometric mean instead, does not alter the results signi￿cantly.
Still, Caggese (2003, p. 10) has argued that this procedure will lead to biased results, if labor and
capital employment decisions are constrained by some third variable, e.g. by ￿nancial constraints. In our
case r might depend on the ￿nancial conditions. Nevertheless, as we ￿nd an only very minor in￿ uence
of ￿nance on the long-run stock of capital, the bias can be expected to matter only marginally. More
formally, our estimates are consistent under H
0
0; the hypothesis we test.
11Figure 1: Firm￿ speci￿c average wage shares
estimates for the parameters of stationary variables, if these are weakly exogenous. Yet,
if there is lag dependency or if the contemporaneous shocks to equity and capital are
correlated, the PFM-OLS estimator is likely to be biased.
Since productivity is clearly a unit-root process in our data, the parameter estimate
^ ￿+
1 is asymptotically unbiased. However, for our liquidity proxy, the equity-ratio, eit;
which is measured as the ratio of book value of equity over the book value of assets, the
unit-root test rejects the unit root hypothesis and there might be an endogeneity or lag-
dependency problem. To remove the contemporaneous correlation, one can replace eit
by eit￿1 and argue that the beginning of period liquidity determines managerial discount
factors. However, if there is lag dependency, the estimator remains biased.
As ￿1 can be estimated consistently in any case, there is another way to obtain
estimates of ￿2: Since k and k￿￿ are found to be cointegrated indeed, kit￿￿1^ ￿it￿rt￿￿i
is stationary and can be expressed as
zit := xit + ￿0
2eit + ￿00
2eit￿1 = (17)
kit ￿ ^ ￿+
1 ^ ￿it + ^ rt + ^ ￿i = ￿0
2eit + ￿00
2eit￿1 + C￿ (L) it; (18)
with a moving-average error-term C￿ (L) it on the right hand side and a stationary
cointegration error, zit; on the left. In this equation, either ￿0
2 or ￿00
2 is zero if the
beginning-of-period equity ratio or the end-of-period equity ratio determines the man-
12agerial discount rate respectively. Similarly, the equity-ratio depends on its previous
realization and on past and current capital imbalances, so that we have as a second
equation
eit = ￿eit￿1 + ￿1zit + ￿2zit￿1 + ￿it: (19)
If now ￿1 = ￿00
2 = 0 and






2 = 0 and





then the parameters in (19) can be consistently estimated as all regressors are predeter-
mined.19 In a second step (18) can be estimated, using the ￿xed-e⁄ects OLS-residual ^ ￿it
as an instrument for eit.
Since we would rather assume current capital imbalances in￿ uence the current equity
ratio, but not the other way round, models with ￿0
2 = 0 are the preferred ones. Yet,
this comes at the price that the assumption (COV*) is more restrictive: If x measures
fundamental investment incentives imperfectly and current residual changes in equity
re￿ ect productivity, assumption (COV*) will be wrong and our estimates will be biased
upwards. However, we can expect the endogeneity problem to be less pronounced for
these instrumental variable estimators ^ ￿IV
2 than for the PFM-OLS estimate ^ ￿+
2 :
2.4.2 Estimation of the investment function
Having estimated the long-run relation between capital, productivity and ￿nance, we
can turn towards estimating the investment equation. Similar to the standard error-
correction framework, the error term is obtained as
xit := k￿￿
it ￿ kit￿1 = ^ ￿+
1 ^ ￿it + ^ ￿IV
2 eit￿1 ￿ (^ rt + ^ ￿i) ￿ kit￿1: (20)
19Strictly speaking, this is only true if T ! 1; as we use ￿xed e⁄ects OLS. Therefore, in small
samples our estimates are biased. However, we are mainly interested in generating an instrument that is
orthogonal to the within transformed variables, but contains information on et: Hence, one should not
interpret the estimates of (19) structurally.
To avoid this problem at least for the estimation of (19) we additionally estimate a IV-regression of
this equation in ￿rst di⁄erences, in which ￿eit￿1 is instrumented by eit￿2 and ￿eit￿2: Yet, we only
obtain ￿￿it as error-term, which may be correlated with ￿it under assumption (COV) as ￿it and ￿it￿1
may be correlated. Hence, we use ￿￿t+1 as instrument for et: The results are reported under IV-PDOLS,
but are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the ones obtained by ￿xed e⁄ects OLS. Nevertheless, notice that
for (19) the small sample bias only vanishes if one assumes 8s;t : cov (￿is;￿it) = 0:
13The linear error-correction model results in the following investment equation




j ￿it￿j + ￿it: (21)
In this equation the ￿-terms, ￿ :=
￿
￿k ￿^ ￿ ￿e
￿T
; pick up the short-run dynamics.
Without short-run dynamics, this error-correction model corresponds to a micro-model
with quadratic adjustment costs. More general forms of adjustment costs, including ￿xed
costs, transform the adjustment speed parameter ￿ into a function (here approximated








￿jk (xit ￿ ￿ xi:)
j (eit ￿ ￿ ei:)
k
3
5(xit ￿ ￿ xi:) + ￿it:
If adjustment costs are non-convex, then the adjustment speed @i
@x increases when the
gap x becomes larger than its average value ￿ xi::
Besides this semi-parametric estimation for investment, we also carry out a nonpara-
metric analysis. This allows us, to obtain direct inference on the average derivatives
of expected investment with respect to ￿nance and fundamentals. To analyze the data
non-parametrically, the data are pooled after individual ￿xed e⁄ects have been removed.
The derivatives are then calculated by applying a local linear kernel-estimator to the
data. For this estimation, two estimators are most prominent candidates: One is Li et
al.￿ s (1998) (analytic) estimator from the local linear regression in which the average
derivative is computed by taking the sample average over the pointwise estimates of
^ ￿x;e (q); q := (x;e): These pointwise estimates are generated by weighted least squares
on
yi = m(q) + ￿x (q)(xi ￿ x) + ￿e (q)(ei ￿ e) + ui; q := (x;e): (22)
The weights themselves are computed using a kernel-function.20 Alternatively, numerical
derivatives can be used, which are obtained as












; q := (x;e); (23)
where hq;k is the (variable) window-width used to generate kernels at evaluation point
q; ek is the k-th unit-vector, and ^ m again is the weighted least squares estimate.21
20This estimator is asymptotically equivalent to Rilstone￿ s (1991) estimator.
21In most cases the numerical estimator has better small sample (and asymptotic bias) properties
14Average derivatives are computed as sample-means of e ￿x;e (q): Both the analytic and
the numerical average derivative estimator converge with parametric rates. In the non-
parametric analysis, a Gaussian-product kernel has been employed. To generate window
width hq;k, an adaptive two-stage estimator for the window width was used, starting
with a ￿xed window width of skn￿1=4; in the ￿rst stage, in which sk stands for the
standard deviation of argument k and n is the number of observations.22
3 Brief description of the data
The data that we analyze come from the ￿ Bonner Stichprobe￿ which is a sample of
annual company accounts of German companies. Most of which are large listed stock
companies. The data covers the time-period 1960 to 1997. The panel is unbalanced and
contains 694 companies (observational units) and 18943 observations in total. Thus, the
average time of a company in the sample is 28.7 years.
The database includes complete pro￿t- and loss-statements as well as annual ac-
counting data. Moreover, for the allmost all company years data on average wages and
salaries as well as on the number of employees are reported.
Firms which are holding companies ("Holdinggesellschaft"), or groups ("Konzernge-
sellschaft") have to be removed from the sample. Their company accounts basically
duplicate company accounts of operating companies that are also recorded in the data
or summarize the accounting information of the companies within the group only par-
tially.23 Additionally, we have to drop a few ￿rm years for which data seems inconsistent
with usual accounting standards (e.g. negative depreciation, very high appreciation).
This leaves us with a sample of about 10000 observations.
If a ￿rm series is split into two parts by removing a single observation (due to data
inconsistency) and if both parts are long enough to be sensibly analyzed, the second part
of the series is identi￿ed as a new ￿rm. If the missing observation separated the series
into a very short and a longer one, the short one was completely removed, i.e. only ￿rms
with ￿ve or more consecutive observations remain in the sample. Additionally, single
observations were removed, if the investment rate di⁄ered from its mean by 5 times
the standard deviation (removing 11 observations), if the current equity ratio (in logs)
di⁄ered from the ￿rm mean log-equity ratio by 4 standard deviations (39 observations),
(Ullah and Roy, 1998). However, its asymptotic variance is not yet known (Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
22See Pagan and Ullah (1999) for details on the non-parametric estimation techniques.
Moreover, note that in comparison to pointwise derivative estimations, this choice of window width
leads to substantial undersmoothing.
23For example there is "RWE Holding AG" which has no other economic activity but holding 100%
of the stock of "RWE AG". The former is traded on the stock market whereas the latter is not.
15Table 1: Descriptive Statistics "Bonner-Stichprobe"
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
investment-rate 9770 0.210 0.120 -0.140 0.8254
capital 9770 164.9 491.5 0.036 6893.2
equity-ratio 9770 0.403 0.139 0.016 0.9371
real wage 9770 14.80 4.969 1.756 36.908
total value added (turnover) 9770 464.7 1415 0 20584
No. Employees 9770 6009 17813 4 215800
or if the turnover-change di⁄ered from the mean by 6-times the standard deviation (16
observations). Moreover, ￿rms were excluded, if their average wage-share or proxied
average cost-of-capital share exceeded 70% (removing 122 observations). This leaves us
with 449 ￿rms and a total of 9770 observations, making an average of 21.75 accounting
years per ￿rm.
The stock of capital series has been generated using the perpetual inventory method,
investment, wages and pro￿t were de￿ ated using the producer-price index for investment
goods. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Although Goolsbee and Gross
(1997) report that assuming a homogeneous capital good biases the estimated investment
function towards a linear speci￿cation, it is necessary to do so in this paper, since
many ￿rms do not report stock and depreciation of land and buildings and machinery
separately.
However, although we measure investment rates on the basis of a homogenous cap-
ital good, investment rates still exhibit moderate excess skewness and kurtosis. That
kurtosis and skewness is only moderate re￿ ects the fact that most ￿rms in the sample
are aggregates of many plants, but only at the plant level is investment highly lumpy.
Still, we ￿nd that 17.4% of all ￿rm years exhibit an investment-spike and these spikes
account for 36.1 % of all investment, when using the widely employed cut-o⁄ value of
30% for the de￿nition of such a spike.
Since Cooper and Willis (2004) have emphasized the importance of the assump-
tion of a unit-root in productivity for the gap model, we test this assumption. The
time-dimension of the sample that we use is only moderate compared to the number of
observational units and the sample is unbalanced. Therefore, the Breitung-Meyer (1994)
unit-root test has been chosen. Table 2 reports the results. The hypothesis of a unit
root cannot be rejected for capital, revenues (turnover), the number of employees, and
for the measure of capital-productivity ^ ￿ that has been described in the previous sec-
tions. We can however reject the unit root hypothesis for the equity ratio. Also for the
16Table 2: Breitung-Meyer Unit-Root Tests
Variable estim. root sign. of ￿ ￿ 1
log No. Employees 1.034 1
log turnover 1.010 1
log capital 1.008 1
log equity-ratio 0.965 0
^ ￿ 1.010 1
x 0.965 0
cointegration error x; we can reject the null of a unit-root. Consequently, productivity
^ ￿ and capital must be cointegrated.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Long-run optimal stock of capital
The cointegration relation (16) can be estimated using the Panel-Dynamic-OLS-Estimator
(PD-OLS) of Kao and Chiang (2000), the Panel-Full-Modi￿ed-OLS-Estimator (PFM-
OLS) of Phillips and Moon (1999); or OLS controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects. The PD-OLS
estimator usually puts no cross-sectional restriction on the short-run dynamics. How-
ever, allowing for heterogeneous short-run dynamics in the PD-OLS regression means
including more than 2300 parameters (for 2 lags and 2 leads of ￿rst di⁄erences). There-
fore, the PD-OLS regressions assume a homogeneous short-run dynamics in all but two
speci￿cations (PD-OLS-Ind). In these two speci￿cations industry speci￿c short-run-
dynamics are assumed.24 All regressions control for ￿xed time- and ￿rm-e⁄ects. Table 3
presents the main results of the four PD-OLS, two PFM-OLS and the OLS regressions.
Model PD-OLS(-Ind)-1 includes 3 lags and leads of ￿^ ￿; while model PD-OLS(-Ind)-2
only includes 2 lags and leads, but of both ￿e and ￿^ ￿: Standard errors are calculated
on the basis of the PFM-OLS estimate, using the average number of observations per
￿rm for the respective calculation of the standard error. Standard errors are generated
for both, the case where the regressors are I(1) and the case where the regressors are
I(0). Signi￿cance is indicated on the I(1) basis.
Although ￿1 is signi￿cant in all regressions and the estimates are reasonably large, the
parameter of productivity ￿1 is clearly smaller than 1. This means that the static target
level of capital and the dynamic optimal level of capital di⁄er somewhat. One reason for
this could be that a ￿xed percentage of revenues has to be attributed to a not modelled
24The industry variable provided in the Bonn Database has been used for classi￿cation. This variable
splits up the database in 52 di⁄erent industries. Note however, that this variable does not coincide with
SIC.
17Table 3: Single-Stage Cointegration regressions





0.7626*** 0.7404*** 0.7442*** 0.7717***
￿2 (log equity-ratio) -0.0386 -0.0275 -0.0144 -0.0175
No. of Parameters 39 43 378 535
No. of Observations 6612 7447 7447 6612a
No. of Firms 383 416 383 412





0.6938*** 0.6009*** 0.6442*** 0.02768
￿2 (log equity-ratio) -0.0345 -0.0484* 0.03813 0.02544
No. of Parameters 39 39 39 std. err. I(0)
No. of Observations 9289 8823 9767 ￿1 .02802
No. of Firms 442 442 442 ￿2 .02763
***=**=* indicate signi￿cance at the 1/5/10% level
(quasi-)rent. This would deterministically drive up the productivity measure. Another
reason for ￿ < 1 could be that wages endogenously react to productivity growth in the
long-run. In both cases, the gap between desired and actual capital is still recovered by
the regression. Moreover, the estimates for ￿1 are in line with the estimates Caballero
et al. (1995) obtained for their cost-of capital proxy.25
For the estimate of ￿2 evidence is mixed assuming that the log equity-ratio is I(1):
However, the unit-root test clearly rejects this hypothesis. Therefore, we use a formula
analogous to the general one provided in Phillips (1995, p. 1038, eq. 14) to determine
the standard error of the I(0) regressor e: Now, the standard error increases slightly,
since the parameter estimates of I(0) variables are not super-consistent. In consequence,
hypothesis H0
0 cannot be rejected, which means the equity-ratio has no in￿ uence on the
optimal-stock of capital. Moreover, all estimates except the OLS one have a negative
sign. This means that higher equity ratios lead to lower optimal stocks of capital, which
is contradictory to most of the earlier empirical ￿nancing-constraints literature. Also
this seems inconsistent with the ￿ wealth e⁄ect on the cost-of-capital￿explanation that
now is common in a number of theoretical (macro-)models since the seminal contribution
of Bernanke et al. (1999).
Yet, our regressions have not controlled for the endogeneity of the equity-ratio. The
￿xed e⁄ects only remove a di⁄erent baseline access to capital markets. Additionally, the
25However, if adjustment costs strongly dampen the variation of capital, it is well known, that our
estimator will underestimate ￿1 by construction (Caballero, 1997, p. 8).
18PD-OLS and the PFM-OLS account for short-run correlations. (See Phillips (1995) for
details).
However, if there is lag dependency in the equity ratio, or if the contemporaneous
shocks to equity and capital are correlated, the PFM-OLS and the PD-OLS estimates ^ ￿+
2
are likely to be biased. The parameter estimate for productivity ^ ￿+
1 remains asymptot-
ically unbiased in any case because of the unit root in productivity ^ ￿. The contempora-
neous correlation problem can be reduced by replacing et by et￿1: This is even the better
speci￿cation theoretically, if liquidity at the beginning of the period determines manage-
rial discount factors. The resulting estimates are reported in column PFM-OLS (et￿1).
The estimate for ￿2 decreases further, becomes smaller and is now weakly signi￿cant.
However, if there is lag dependency, the estimator still remains biased.
Therefore, we employ the two-step approach that has been developed in section 2.
This instrumental-variable approach basically builds on the assumption that there is a
triangular structure in the gap-equity relation, see equations (17) - (19). Table 4 presents
the two-step estimates. Again, we cannot reject hypothesis H0
0 of no long run in￿ uence
of the equity ratio on the desired levels of capital. The estimated coe¢ cient for equity is
even closer to zero as the coe¢ cient increases (from negative towards zero) if we control
for endogeneity. This increase may be explained as follows: when high productivity (high
gap) ￿rms increase their stock of capital, they ￿nance this increase of the capital stock
with internal funds. This drives down the equity ratio and yields the found negative
correlation of the equity ratio and the capital stock if endogeneity is not controlled for.
Now when endogeneity is controlled for, the estimated parameter ￿2 has a cost of
capital interpretation. Since the estimated coe¢ cients ￿1;2 equal @x
@￿ and @x
@e up to a








￿1 (see section 2 equation (4)). Based on the estimated parameters this
elasticity lies approximately between -0.02 and 0.065. Hence, ￿nance is negligible for
the long-run ￿rm decisions. Consequently, if there was no additional frequency e⁄ect for
￿nance on investment, i.e. H1




@x; ￿nance also would not matter
for investment.26
This hypothesis is tested next. To be as conservative as possible in testing for H1
0; we
use the PD-OLS-Ind-1 model with ￿0
2 = 0 for estimating the investment-function, since
the corresponding estimates for the long-run in￿ uence of equity are among the largest
ones for a ￿ ￿0
2 = 0￿ -model.
26There is also an important technical implication of this result. Since the stock of capital and the
equity-ratio are uncorrelated in the long run, the equity ratio e￿ our ￿nancial variable￿ cannot have much
predictive value for future productivity, once current productivity is controlled for.
19Table 4: Two-Stage Cointegration regressions
Model ￿00






￿1 0 (assumed) -0.0177
￿2 0.0119 0.0285**
￿ 0.8057*** 0.8058***





















￿1 0 (assumed) -0.0176
￿2 0.0058 0.0068
￿ 0.5436*** 0.5458***
***=**=* indicate signi￿cance at the 1/5/10% level;
a Std. Err. from ￿rst stage PFM-OLS is 0.02833
204.2 Investment behavior
4.2.1 Parametric Analysis
Consequently, for the analysis of investment the gap between desired and actual stock
of capital is measured as
xit := k￿
it ￿ kit￿1 = ^ ￿+
1 ^ ￿it + ^ ￿IV
2 eit￿1 ￿ (^ rt + ^ ￿i) ￿ kit￿1; (24)
where the estimates of ^ ￿+
1 ; ^ ￿IV
2 from PD-OLS-Ind-1 are used. This gap can be interpreted
as mandated investment. Fixed e⁄ects are removed by subtracting ￿rm-speci￿c means
from all variables: This especially controls for inter-￿rm di⁄erences in the optimal capital
imbalance which result from di⁄erent target levels of capital. In contrast, it is not
obvious how to treat aggregate shocks and estimate ^ rt: The coe¢ cients of time-dummies
used in the cointegration regression would also pick up the state of aggregate mandated
investment (which is to the most extent driven by productivity). However, aggregate
mandated investment should not be subtracted from the individual mandated investment
as both together determine the actual investment of a ￿rm non-linearly. Hence, we
project the series of the time-speci￿c e⁄ects obtained from the cointegration-regression
on a series of real-interest rates and take these projections as estimate of ^ rt:27 Last, we
need to determine which equity ratio to use. Since the equity ratio at the beginning
of the investment period is predetermined and also more likely to shape managerial
decisions, the equity-ratio used in the investment regressions is the equity ratio in the









￿jk (xit ￿ ￿ xi:)
j (eit ￿ ￿ ei:)
k
1
A(xit ￿ ￿ xi:) + ￿it: (25)
The direct in￿ uence of e (j = ￿1) re￿ ects that the ￿rm-average mandated investment
(gap) ￿ xi: and the target level are only equal up to a constant since depreciation deter-
ministically opens a gap between actual and desired capital between two adjustments.
The parametric estimates for the investment function show a moderate degree of
27The correlation between the real-interst-rates and the time-speci￿c e⁄ects is quite low. This re￿ ects
the fact, that the aggregate (average) capital-imbalance is mainly driven by productivity and / or
demand-shocks, which vary more than the real interest-rate.
28To preclude the possibility that our results are driven by extreme observations of mandated invest-
ment, we remove all observations from the sample which deviate by more than 4 standard deviations
from the ￿rm-speci￿c average in the capital-imbalance measure.
21Table 5: Short-Run Parametric Estimates
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.) Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
x 0.1495*** 0.0058 0.1504*** 0.0042
x2 0.0650*** 0.0112 0.0662*** 0.0111
x3 -0.0416* 0.0231 -0.0429*** 0.0073
x4 -0.0415*** 0.0113 -0.0414** 0.0110
x5 -0.0204 0.0162 ￿ ￿
e 0.0246* 0.0091 0.0162*** 0.0045
e2 0.0666** 0.0258 0.0329** 0.0132
e3 -0.1430 0.0796 ￿ ￿
e4 -0.0792* 0.0592 ￿ ￿
e5 0.2718 0.1274 ￿ ￿
xe 0.0358*** 0.0130 0.0347*** 0.0122
(xe)
2 -0.0630 0.0439 -0.0840** 0.0398
xe2 0.0152 0.0288 ￿ ￿
x2e 0.0240 0.0216 ￿ ￿
const -0.0060*** 0.0014 -0.0052*** 0.0013
Adj. R2 0.1977 ￿ 0.1973 ￿
No. Obs. 8973 ￿ 8973 ￿
***=**=* signi￿cant at the 1/5/10% level
convexity with respect to mandated investment, x. The average second order derivative
@2i
@x2 equals 0:126.29 Moreover, the investment function becomes concave when x is about
as large as one standard deviation. Although the investment function should be convex
with non-convex adjustment cost, this convexity of the investment function should not
be taken at face value as evidence against the ￿xed adjustment cost model. It more
likely re￿ ects the fact, that most companies in the sample are multi-establishment/multi-
plant ￿rms, so their individual investment function rather equals an average over many
investment functions of di⁄erent plants with mean capital imbalance x: Due to this fact￿
and as for example Whited (2004) or Goolsbee and Gross (1997) argue￿ the observed
investment function becomes less curved. Figure 2 plots the shape of the estimated
investment function for 1.5 standard deviations around the means of x and e.
The relatively strong in￿ uence of the equity ratio reveals that ￿nance e⁄ects invest-
ment mainly through altering the adjustment frequency. This is also re￿ ected by an
important interaction between fundamental capital imbalance x and the ￿nancial vari-
able e. This frequency e⁄ect is much harder to interpret in a model with convex costs
29Average parametric derivatives are calculated by di⁄erencing the estimated function (Model 2) and
then averaging over the observation-wise calculated derivatives.
22Figure 2: Investment function, e and x between 1.5 std. errors
than in a model with non-convex adjustment costs. Intuitively in a convex cost model
with liquidity dependent cost of capital, the in￿ uence of the equity-ratio should be com-
pletely captured by the previously estimated long-run e⁄ect. In line with this intuition
and with our results, Whited (2004) reports that for a simulated model with non-convex
adjustment cost and ￿nancial frictions the ￿nancial frictions only in￿ uence investment
hazards but not optimal capital levels.
Still, in our data the fundamental investment incentives x explain most of the (ex-
plained) variation in investment and the adjusted R2 is notably large for an investment
regression. This also shows that the quality of ^ x is relatively good as a measure of
investment incentives.30 Compared to Cooper and Haltiwanger￿ s (2002) results for the
reduced form investment equation, the R2-statistics is substantially larger. Since we
have borrowed the general technique to measure productivity from their paper but al-
lowed for technological heterogeneity, the increase in R2 may potentially be interpreted
as evidence for technological heterogeneity being non-negligible.
In table 6 average derivatives @i
@e for the parametric model are reported. The results
are in line with the frequency-e⁄ect interpretation of short term in￿ uences of equity
on investment introduced in section 2: Equity has a much larger e⁄ect if there are
strong fundamental investment incentives anyway. Interestingly, the Kaplan and Zin-
30Typical R
2 statistics in most (homogeneous) investment regressions (using q or some other estimator
for productivity) range in between 5 and 10%. See for instance Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002) or Barnett
and Sakellaris (1999).
23Table 6: Parametric estimates
of average derivative @i
@e
x ￿ 0 x > 0
e ￿ 0 ￿0:0001 0:0110
e > 0 0:0194 0:0328
gales (1997) result, that ￿nancially constrained ￿rms are less sensitive to changes in
liquidity is replicated. Firms with below ￿ normal￿equity exhibit a far lower average
derivative with respect to equity.
4.2.2 Non-parametric Analysis
As the parametric analysis naturally depends on the choice of the functional form a
nonparametric analysis has also been employed. Additionally, this allows us to obtain
direct inference on the derivatives of expected investment with respect to ￿nance and
fundamentals. To analyze the data non-parametrically, the data are pooled after indi-
vidual ￿xed e⁄ects have been removed. The estimation techniques have been outlined
in section 2.3.
Table 7 reports average derivative estimates for both the direct and the numerical es-
timator. Additionally, a robust estimator e ￿
cens
is calculated as the mean of all point-wise
derivative estimates within ￿5 standard deviations around the mean e ￿. This estimator
is not a⁄ected by outliers generated by undersmoothing and low density in the tails of
the distribution of x;e, and i:
Table 7: Average nonparametric derivative estimates
(a): Full sample
￿ ￿x ￿ ￿e
overall 0.137 0.018














Case ￿ ￿x ￿ ￿e
x > 0 e > 0 0.163 0.043
e ￿ 0 0.137 -0.021
x ￿ 0 e > 0 0.124 0.043

















The overall speed of adjustment, measured by the derivative of the investment rate
with respect to the capital imbalance x; is at 0:137 again rather low. This speed of
adjustment is equivalent to an overall half-life of 4.49 years for a gap between desired
24and actual stock of capital. In comparison, the average derivative with respect to eq-
uity is, at 0:0142; quite substantial. An e⁄ect of that size would result in a long-run
elasticity of capital k with respect to liquidity e of approximately 0.1 in the linear error
correction model model (21). This is substantially larger than the previously obtained
long-run estimate. Moreover the estimated in￿ uence of ￿nance on investment is an e⁄ect
additionally to the one the equity-ratio has on x: Therefore, the hypothesis H1
0 of no
frequency e⁄ect is equivalent to a test of ￿e = 0: Consequently, we clearly have to reject
H1
0 in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a frequency e⁄ect of liquidity on invest-
ment. Therefore, one can expect ￿nance, e, and fundamental investment incentives, x;
to interact in a complex manner.
This is validated by looking at the sample strati￿ed by values of e and x: Firms with
abundant ￿nancial (e > 0) resources that wish to increase capital (x > 0) adjust 27%
faster than they do when ￿nancial resources are scarce (e ￿ 0 and x > 0). If ￿rms wish
to decrease the stock of capital (x ￿ 0) there is no such strong e⁄ect of ￿nance, at best
larger internal funds make those ￿rms more reluctant to decrease their stock of capital.
Additionally the strati￿ed non-parametric estimates reveal a non-linear relationship of
investment and the gap only for ￿rms with above normal equity ratios. The picture
remains the same irrespective of the actual choice of the estimator.
5 Discussion
The aim of this paper￿ as formulated in section 2￿ was to test hypothesis H0
0 and H1
0,
the ￿ long-run￿and ￿ short-run versions￿of the Modigliani and Miller theorem, if one
likes. With respect to these hypotheses we can state the following:
1. H0
0 can at best be rejected on weak grounds, so in the long-run ￿nance does not
seem to matter.
2. Since the estimated short-run in￿ uence of equity, measured by the average deriv-
ative, is both substantial and signi￿cant, H1
0 has to be rejected. This holds true,
as we only tested for additional short-run in￿ uences of liquidity on investment.
Hence, the question arises, why there is the additional short-run e⁄ect that has been
found. Inspecting the short-run parametric and nonparametric estimates, we ￿nd a
substantial interaction of ￿nance and fundamentals in determining investment.
To further condense the results and to give them a more intuitive appeal, table 8
presents (geometric) means of pointwisely calculated half-lifes of capital imbalances.
These are calculated as ln0:5
ln(1￿^ ￿(x)): As the pointwise derivatives exhibit large varia-
tion, and sometimes obtain negative values or are larger than 1, the derivatives are
25Table 8: Average half-lifes
of capital-imbalances (in years)
x ￿ 0 x > 0
e ￿ 0 5.06 4.41
e > 0 5.19 4.07
re-estimated with a three times larger window width. Again the larger x; the faster is
investment, and if ￿rms wish to invest, more equity speeds up investment.
A potential shortcoming of our analysis might be that we omitted short run dynamics
to keep the empirical model simple and close to the theoretical gap model. However,
one may argue that the non-linearities found are a mere result of the omitted dynamic
links between changes in productivity, capital, and the equity-ratio.32 Table 9 presents
the regression results from a model similar to the one in table 5 but augmented by some
short-run dynamics.
Though the point estimates change, the overall structure of the estimated error-
correction, i.e. investment function, remains the same. Moreover, the serial correlation
as measured by the parameter on ￿kit￿1 is small although signi￿cant. Hence, our
results seem￿ at least to a certain extent￿ robust to the inclusion of short-run dynamics.
However, the levels of signi￿cance of the terms involving equity drop. Yet, they jointly
remain highly signi￿cant.
We may also brie￿ y compare the results obtained for the German data in the preced-
ing section, with the results for the UK data analyzed in the companion paper (Bayer,
2002). As the Cambridge DTI-Database, on which is the UK data used, does not contain
wage data for a large number of ￿rms, but yearly data on ￿rm-speci￿c subsidies, the
"within variation" (i.e. after controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects) in subsidies has been used to
estimate the coe¢ cient on the user cost of capital ￿ instead of the one on productivity
￿1: Table 10 cites the regression results for this cointegrating relation. The coe¢ cient for
the user-cost of capital is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from its neoclassical benchmark value
1 and the coe¢ cient ￿ of the equity-ratio is small but statistically signi￿cant and still
larger than the one we obtained for the German sample.
For the investment function, again the estimated derivative with respect to the equity
ratio is much larger than the coe¢ cient in the cointegration relation; Table 11 reports
the estimated average derivatives of the investment function. ￿ bFE is Ullah and Roy￿ s
32While a structural interpretation for including the lagged change in the stock of capital could be
a delivery lag, an interpretation for other short-run dynamics is far from obvious; and even if we ￿nd
a signi￿cant short-run dynamics, this could well be due to an imperfect approximation of the true
functional form which is picked up by the ￿rst-di⁄erences of the equity-ratio and productivity.
26Table 9: short-run parametric estimates, dynamics-augmented
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.) Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
￿kit￿1 0.1627*** 0.0064 0.1630*** 0.0064
￿eit -0.0204** 0.0064 -0.0210*** 0.0064
￿eit￿1 0.0276*** 0.0073 0.0281*** 0.0073
￿￿it 0.0340*** 0.0073 0.0340*** 0.0073
￿￿it￿1 0.0458*** 0.0074 0.0459*** 0.0074
(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1) 0.1586*** 0.0060 0.1580*** 0.0044
(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)
2 0.0394*** 0.0116 0.0405*** 0.0115
(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)
3 -0.0579** 0.0251 -0.0458*** 0.0081
(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)
4 -0.0255* 0.0132 -0.0237* 0.0128
(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)
5 0.0067 0.0191 ￿ ￿
eit￿1 0.0194** 0.0091 0.0105** 0.0049
e2
it￿1 0.0604** 0.0260 0.0306** 0.0134
e3
it￿1 -0.1302 0.0805 ￿ ￿
e4
it￿1 -0.0809 0.0595 ￿ ￿
e5
it￿1 0.2252 0.1310 ￿ ￿
(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)eit￿1 0.0239* 0.0135 0.0205 0.0128
[(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)eit￿1]
2 -0.0550 0.0501 -0.0972** 0.0432
(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)e2
it￿1 0.0373 0.0315 ￿ ￿
(k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)
2 eit￿1 0.0084 0.0240 ￿ ￿
const -0.0094*** 0.0013 -0.0088*** 0.0013
Adj. R2 0.2637 0.2635
No. Obs. 8153 8153
***=**=* signi￿cant at the 1/5/10% level
Note that k￿
it := ^ ￿+
1 ^ ￿it + ^ rt + ^ ￿i + ￿00
2eit￿1; x := (k￿
it ￿ kit￿1)
Table 10: Estimates from the cointegration regression
(UK-sample, PFM-OLS, Within)
￿ ￿ Observations
PFM-OLSa 0:079*** 0:98*** 5944
prelim. OLS 0:070 1:08
std. err. I(1) 0:026 0:07
std. err. I(0)b 0:035 0:14
OLS 0:082 0:71 7147
a Only observational units have been used for which
(outliers removed) 5 or more observations are available.
b The standard errors are obtain as panel analogues
to Phillips (1995, p. 1033⁄).
27Table 11: UK-sample￿ Average ￿rst-order derivatives
of the investment rate i(e;z)
Number of observations: N = 6950 std. deviation




@^ x 0:5057 0:5146 0:5341 0:0068
@b i
@e 0:1555 0:1588 0:1782 0:0097
(1998) ￿xed e⁄ects estimator.
Interestingly, the response of the investment-rate to changes in equity is even larger
for the UK sample. The sensitivity of investment to liquidity is still larger for the UK
sample when the smaller half-lives of capital imbalances in the UK are taken into account
for the comparison to the German sample. This result is similar to what Bond et al.
(2003) report. In their analysis they focus on cross-country di⁄erences in the in￿ uence of
liquidity on investment and ￿nd that ￿nancial factors appear to be much more in￿ uential
for a sample of UK ￿rms than for a sample of German ￿rms. However, in our case the
estimation procedures for the German and the UK sample slightly di⁄ers, so that any
di⁄erences in estimates have to be interpreted with more care than in the case of Bond
et al. (2003).
6 Conclusion
In this paper the interaction of ￿xed capital adjustment costs and ￿nancial frictions was
studied empirically. To do so, a proxy for the productivity of investment was obtained.
This proxy explicitly accounted for the technological heterogeneity of the observed ￿rms.
Since capital productivity follows an I(1) process in the analyzed sample and is coin-
tegrated with capital, we have performed a two step non-linear cointegration analysis
for capital and investment. From the estimation of the long-run relation, we found that
liquidity is hardly correlated with the choice of capital. Accordingly, in the long-run the
hypothesis that ￿nance does not matter or put di⁄erently the Modigliani-Miller theorem
holds, respectively cannot be rejected.
However, the picture substantially changes, if the e⁄ect of ￿nance on investment
decisions is analyzed. Larger equity ratios starkly increase the speed of adjustment of
capital to its equilibrium level. This means that ￿nancial considerations primarily have
intertemporal substitution e⁄ects for investment. Firms endowed with more ￿nancial
means do not invest more, but they invest more often (and in smaller amounts) than
￿rms which have lesser ￿nancial means. Figuratively, ￿nance is the grease but not the
28fuel of investment.
This ￿nding, just like the others of our analysis, obviously hinges on the quality of
the proxy used for capital productivity and later for mandated investment. The derived
measure of mandated investment (gap) can explain a large fraction of the variation in
investment. This suggests that the proxy can be considered as reasonable. Moreover
and since the proxy explicitly allows for heterogeneity, the relatively good quality of the
proxy suggests that there is indeed a substantial degree of technological heterogeneity
across ￿rms. On the more formal side, the econometric issues raised by Cooper and
Willis (2004) do not apply to our data since productivity is non-stationary. Therefore,
the di⁄erences in adjustment speeds at high and low mandated investment can be inter-
preted structurally as evidence for non-convex adjustment cost recon￿rming our a priori
assumption of non-convex costs. Moreover, the di⁄erences in the adjustment speed are
not only econometrically but also economically signi￿cant.
These estimation results raise the question of what to conclude for economic primi-
tives. Although the estimation technique of the present paper does not recover the pa-
rameters of economic primitives, such as the adjustment cost function, themselves and
hence does not allow us to draw strong structural conclusions directly, some economic
structures are more compatible with our results than others. That ￿nance primarily
in￿ uences the adjustment speed but not the level of the stock of capital, for example,
intuitively seems to be not compatible with a model in which the managerial discount
factor depends strongly on the ￿nancial situation of a company.
Similarly our results have some policy implications although they come from a re-
duced form model: Suppose there are shocks to the balance sheet positions of ￿rms (e.g.
through exchange rates as in CØspedes et al. (2000), Aghion et al. (2001) or Devereux
and Lane (2001)), then this paper￿ s results predict a strong short run real impact but a
weak long-run impact, which is somewhat di⁄erent to the ￿nancial accelerator model of
Bernanke et al. (1999). Moreover, this impact will depend on the position of the econ-
omy along the business cycle. Thus policies that in￿ uence the balance sheet (shocks) will
be rated di⁄erently along the business cycle. Therefore, policy makers, central banks for
example, need to take into account both, the fundamental economic investment incen-
tives for companies and their ￿nancial situation to forecast the e⁄ectiveness of a given
policy. For tax policy the results also provide some interesting detail. A tax system that
encourages higher equity ratios may be welfare enhancing. Firms in such systems would
adjust their stock of capital to its desired level more frequently, so that the aggregate
allocation of real capital becomes more e¢ cient, at least in the partial model studied.
297 Data Appendix
The dataset used is the ￿ Bonner Stichprobe￿ , a sample of annual company accounts of
German companies. To the very most, these companies are large listed stock companies.
As explained in the main text, some companies have to be removed since their accounts
are only consolidated accounts of other companies in the sample (holding companies or
goups) and do not contain actual information on individual economic activities.
Additionally we remove observations for which the data seemed inconsistent with
usual accounting standards (e.g. negative depreciation, very high appreciation) or oth-
erwise seemed to be mis-reportings (like changes in the stock of capital by more than
factor 10) are removed from the sample, sample size drops substantially to 9969 obser-
vations. If removing a single observation (due to data inconsistency) splits a ￿rm-series
into two parts which are long enough to be sensibly analyzed, the second part of the
series is identi￿ed as a di⁄erent ￿rm. If the missing observation separated the series
into a very short and a longer one, the short one was completely removed, i.e. only
￿rms with ￿ve or more consecutive observations remain in the sample. Additionally,
single observations were removed, if the investment rate di⁄ered from the mean by 5
times the standard deviation (removing 11 observations), di⁄ered from the ￿rm speci￿c
log-equity ratio by 4 standard deviations (39 observations), or if the turnover-change
di⁄ered from the mean by 6-times the standard deviation (16 observations). Moreover,
￿rms were excluded, if their average wage-share or proxied average cost-of-capital share
exceeded 70% (removing 122 observations). This leaves us with 449 ￿rms and a total
of 9770 observations, making an average of 21.75 accounting years per ￿rm. In many
cases series for ￿ land and buildings￿and ￿ machinery￿were not reported separately over
the full sample period. Therefore ￿ capital￿is identi￿ed as ￿ total tangible ￿xed assets￿
(￿ Sachanlageverm￿gen￿ ). The equity ratio is de￿ned as the sum of all assets minus total
liabilities (as reported in the balance "Verbindlichkeiten") devided by the sum of all
assets ("Bilanzsumme"). However, the sum of all assets is corrected for the di⁄erent
valuation of tangible assets following the perpetual inventory method instead of taking
their book value.
Depreciation rates were generated as reported depreciation relative to the reported
stock of capital before depreciation. For a number of ￿rm-years the data contains capital
sales as well as gross investment. For some ￿rm years only investment net of capital sales
are reported. The stock of capital used for the analysis was generated by the perpetual
inventory method. Investment was de￿ ated by the producers-price index for investment
goods. To account for sales of capital, it was assumed that in case capital is sold, the
30capital stock of each vintage is reduced by the same fraction. Thus we obtain for the
capital series (in real terms):














Here b Kit is the reported stock of capital of ￿rm i at time t. CSit are reported capital-
sales and Iit is reported investment, Pt is the price-index, Ti is the year when ￿rm i joins
the sample. Wages, pro￿ts etc. were also de￿ ated using the producer-price index for
investment goods as well.
By using the perpetual inventory method, problems induced by a change in account-
ing standards in 1987 are partly avoided. However, the perpetual inventory method
leads to di⁄erent (mostly larger) stocks of capital than reported. Thus the book-value
of equity was adjusted as well.
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